Bangladesh has a first-past-the-post parliamentary electoral system with single member districts. Such systems tend to be dominated by two large parties. The center-left Awami League (AL) and the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) currently dominate the political stage. Other political parties have had difficulty competing with these two parties at the national level. As citizens can elect only one representative for their constituency, they are less likely to vote for candidates from smaller parties that do not have the reach and resources necessary to win at the national level and thereby influence the allocation of resources. Two other parties, the centrist Jatiya Party (JP) and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), have also played important roles in national politics in spite of their relatively smaller vote shares.

Awami League (AL): Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known as Sheikh Mujib), the AL won the national parliamentary elections of Pakistan in 1970, but President Yahya Khan annulled the results, cracked down on Bengalis in East Pakistan, and arrested Sheikh Mujib in March 1971. After a nine-month-long Liberation War, during which AL leaders formed a provisional government-in-exile, Bangladesh emerged as an independent country on December 16, 1971. Sheikh Mujib, celebrated as Bangabandhu (literally ‘Friend of Bengal’) and the Founder of the Nation, ruled Bangladesh from 1972 until his assassination by army officers in 1975. In 1981, his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, was elected leader of the AL. Sheikh Hasina served two terms as prime minister from 1996 to 2000 and 2008 to 2013. In January 2014, after the AL claimed victory in elections boycotted by the major opposition party, Sheikh Hasina continued serving as prime minister. A center-left party, the AL initially articulated a platform based on socialism, secularism (non-communalism), Bengali nationalism, and close relations with India and the Soviet Union, but over time, it has embraced economic liberalization, emphasized its commitment to Islam, and strengthened relations with the United States.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP): In 1978, the then president, General Ziaur Rahman, founded the center-right BNP. Ziaur Rahman was the army officer who had declared Bangladesh’s independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujib in March 1971 and taken power after Sheikh Mujib’s assassination in 1975. As a response to the AL’s emphasis on Bengali nationalism, the BNP sought to develop a ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’ that would distinguish Bangladeshi Bengalis from Indian Bengalis and emphasize the Muslim identity of the majority of Bangladesh’s citizens. It also sought to establish stronger relations with the United States and Muslim-majority countries, particularly oil-rich ones, and adopted economic liberalization programs. An umbrella party, the BNP attracted people with grievances against the AL, including military personnel, business people, pro-China leftists, and Islamists. The BNP ruled the country from 1979 to 1981 under Ziaur Rahman and then from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006 under the leadership of his widow, Khaleda Zia.

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JI): The JI is Bangladesh’s main Islamist party. During the Liberation War, the JI refused to support freedom fighters and several members collaborated with the Pakistani Army. The 1972 constitution banned religion-based political parties, but Ziaur Rahman allowed the JI to resume political activities. The JI’s vote share in elections has been small, but the BNP has sought (and received) its support to compete against the AL and enabled it to play a disproportionately important role in politics. The JI has made some doctrinal compromises, such as accepting a woman’s political leadership and supporting women’s political participation (Shehabuddin, 2008; interviews, JI members, Dhaka, 2010). It has, however, advocated various restrictions on civil and political liberties. For example, it demanded an anti-blasphemy law in the early 1990s and the declaration of Ahmadiyyas, who self-identify as Muslim, as non-Muslims. The JI’s student wing, the Islami Chhatro Shibir, maintains an active presence on several university campuses. In 2009, the AL-led government set up an International Crimes Tribunal, which convicted several JI leaders for war crimes, amidst accusations from the BNP and JI that the trials sought to incapacitate the opposition rather than serve justice.

Kiren Chaudhry (1993) has argued that post-colonial states often struggle to build responsive political institutions, because these would threaten entrenched interests and require financial and administrative resources that such states usually lack. In order to consolidate power, many leaders preferred to assume direct control over institutions, national resources, and industries in order to build patronage networks, expand their own base of support, and weaken opponents. After the Liberation War in 1971, Bangladesh dove into the challenges of reconstruction and state building with a weakened civil bureaucracy, a factionalized military, and a depleted economy, amidst concerns about Indian hegemony and uncertainty about international recognition and financial support. Such factors made it difficult for leaders to focus on building responsive institutions that could effectively distribute power and economic resources and address citizens’ needs and grievances. Leaders therefore often relied on centralized decision making and patronage to consolidate power and address pressing problems.

Restoring order proved to be a difficult task, as two of the most important state institutions for stability, the civil bureaucracy and military, were weak and fragmented. According to Jahan (1974), tensions and competition arose between bureaucrats who had worked with the government-in-exile during the Liberation War and those who had not. The fragmentation of the bureaucracy complicated the task of reconstruction and restoration of order. A 1972 Presidential Order that permitted the non-appealable dismissal of civil servants fueled concerns about job security, while parliamentary supervision constrained the autonomy of the bureaucracy (Jahan, 1974, pp.129–130; Maniruzzaman, 1975, p.125).

The military was also factionalized and some personnel developed strong grievances toward the AL government. By rewarding officers who had fought for Bangladesh’s liberation with early promotions, AL leaders generated resentment among officers who had been stranded in West Pakistan and repatriated after the war. The Mujib government’s close relations with India, which the Pakistani Army had trained both Bengali and non-Bengali officers to consider the enemy, also irked some army officers (Khan, 1982, p.169; Maniruzzaman, 1975, p.123). Furthermore, certain army personnel complained that most of the annual defense budget went toward supporting the Rakkhi Bahini, a paramilitary force formed by the Mujib government in March 1972 to fight armed insurgents (Jahan, 1973, p.206; Maniruzzaman, 1976, p.122). The fragmentation and perceived marginalization of the army in independent Bangladesh therefore deprived the AL government of a crucial source of political stability.

The majoritarian parliamentary system gave Sheikh Mujib yet another means by which to concentrate power in his own hands amidst intensifying challenges to his government. In January 1975, Sheikh Mujib used the AL’s parliamentary dominance to pass a constitutional amendment that established a presidential system, banned existing political parties, and invited citizens to join a single national party, BAKSAL (the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League). He argued that a one-party presidential system would bolster national unity and reduce political strife, but this move aggravated grievances and heralded the end of Bangladesh’s first democratic experiment.

In the context of the Cold War, Sheikh Mujib’s adoption of a one-party model deepened anxiety among domestic and international anti-socialist forces. Eight months later, disgruntled army officers assassinated Sheikh Mujib and all but two members of his family on August 15, 1975. As a result of this coup, an anti-socialist faction took power and imprisoned four high-profile AL leaders. This faction also promoted Ziaur Rahman from deputy chief of army to chief of army. A complicated power struggle ensued among various factions. On November 3, a pro-Mujib faction moved to regain power from the anti-socialist faction, which, fearing the return of the AL, ordered the murder of the four jailed AL leaders, including Tajuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh’s wartime prime minister. Bangladesh thus lost two of its most iconic civilian politicians, Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmed, within three months. For the next 15 years, the political stage would be dominated by the military.

Rather than developing autonomous and responsive political institutions, Bangladesh’s leaders repeatedly used and reshaped political institutions to consolidate their own power. Military rule under Ziaur Rahman (1975–1981) and Ershad (1982–1990) would continue to treat institutions as malleable and subservient to political interests. Both leaders used constitutional amendments to legalize their actions, indemnify themselves from prosecution, and emphasize their Islamic credentials to gain domestic and international support. Ziaur Rahman replaced ‘secularism’ with ‘Absolute Trust and Faith in Almighty Allah’ and inserted ‘In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful’ into the preamble of the constitution, while Ershad declared Islam the state religion. Their adoption of neoliberal policies such as privatization reinforced patronage networks through crony capitalism. The sale of state-owned enterprises in the 1970s and 1980s gave the leaders a valuable tool for rewarding and gaining supporters. In addition to reshaping institutions to consolidate power, the two leaders also emphasized their contributions toward restoring order, attracting foreign aid, and intensifying development activity (Bertocci, 1982).

Ziaur Rahman and Ershad adopted similar methods to civilianize their rule (Bertocci, 1985, pp.156–157). They organized parliamentary elections only after they had built grassroots support through local elections, won presidential elections to retain leadership of the country, and launched their own political parties. Ziaur Rahman created the BNP in September 1978 to compete with the AL, while Ershad created the JP in January 1986 to compete with the AL and the BNP. Parliamentary elections took place under Ziaur Rahman in February 1979 and under Ershad in May 1986 and March 1988.

In spite of such efforts, Ziaur Rahman and Ershad faced considerable challenges to their rule. Ziaur Rahman was assassinated by army officers in May 1981. Ershad managed to minimize challenges from the army by providing officers considerable benefits, such as bureaucratic appointments, opportunities for corporate engagement, strengthening the Sena Kalyan Sangstha (Army Development Committee), low-cost land acquisition, higher salaries and allowances, improvements in housing and infrastructure in cantonments, and participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Ironically, Ershad’s attempts to win the military’s support through economic incentives eventually increased the army’s stake in maintaining their privileges, rather than keeping Ershad in power (Rahman, 1989; Bhattacharjee, 2010). As Eva Bellin (2012) has argued, the military’s ability to dissociate its interests from the leader’s fate decreases its willingness to repress protestors and generates opportunities for regime change.

Women’s rights organizations, workers, and students also challenged Ershad’s rule. The participation of Islamists in the anti-Ershad movement, according to a member of the JP, pushed Ershad to declare Islam the state religion of Bangladesh through the Eighth Amendment to the constitution in May 1988 to ‘take the wind out of Islamist opponents’ sails’ (interview, member of the JP, Dhaka, March 10, 2010). In response to this instance of institutional manipulation, women’s rights organizations argued the amendment contradicted the constitutional equality of citizens and was unconstitutional. Naripokkho, a feminist organization, filed a case to challenge the amendment (Karim, 2011, p.12). The Ershad regime also generated grievances among trade unions when it broke a promise to ensure workers’ rights (Maniruzzaman, 1992, pp.205–206). In October 1990, student organizations, including the student wings of the BNP and AL, formed the All Party Students’ Unity to demand Ershad’s resignation and parliamentary elections under a non-partisan caretaker government. This put pressure on their parent political parties to maintain a unified front and jointly participate in protests and strikes.

On November 27, 1990, the killing of a doctor, Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, on the Dhaka University campus triggered acts of civil disobedience by journalists, doctors, civil servants, and business people. Ershad sought the military’s support to reinstate martial law, but the army chief, Lieutenant General Nuruddin Khan, refused to support this move and Ershad resigned on December 4 (Maniruzzaman, 1992, pp.207–208). In 1990, the high level of social mobilization and the army’s concerns about economic assets and access to UN peacekeeping missions eroded its willingness to repress protestors. Ershad’s attempts to keep the army satisfied through patronage during his tenure had paradoxically increased the officers’ willingness to replace their patron with one of his political opponents in order to preserve their economic interests (Maniruzzaman, 1992, p.208). On December 6, 1990, in accordance with the demands of the opposition parties, Ershad handed power over to a non-partisan caretaker government, which organized parliamentary elections.

After 15 years of military rule, Bangladesh thus relaunched its democratic transition with a first-past-the-post parliamentary system, a literacy rate of 35.52 percent, and a low per capita GDP. As such, it seemed to lack several ‘prerequisites of democracy’. Adam Przeworski (2004) has argued that democracy is more likely to endure at higher levels of economic development, as people tend to enjoy greater economic security under democracies than dictatorships. Yet, by 2001, Bangladesh seemed to have passed Samuel Huntington’s (1993) two-turnover test for democratic consolidation, meaning there had been two peaceful transfers of power through elections: the AL won elections in 1996 and the BNP won elections in 2001. Bangladesh became one of the few Muslim-majority countries to experience regular transfers of power through independently monitored free and fair elections.

Anxieties about the neutrality of electoral institutions and the need to sustain patron–client relations have, however, fueled political antagonism and violence under civilian rule. Ruling parties’ attempts to weaken the opposition through human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and restrictions on political and civil liberties have reflected the expansion of state power and constrained substantive democratization (Hossain, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Mohaiemen, 2013). Bangladesh shows how ostensibly democratic institutions can cannibalize democracy when they do not adequately ensure power sharing. Bangladesh’s winner-takes-all electoral system accords little power to electoral losers, so winning elections becomes a matter of survival to political parties who fear their elaborate support networks may disintegrate if they are unable to distribute money, administrative positions, jobs, contracts, and protection to supporters. Bangladesh’s economic growth, fueled by ready-made garments exports and remittances from migrant workers, has decreased the country’s reliance on donors for aid and foreign exchange and made losing elections all the more costly. As Akhtar Hossain (2000) writes, ‘economic stakes are too high to lose gracefully’. The struggles over the caretaker government provision illustrate how political actors have continued to see politics as a zero-sum game and resorted to multiple forms of violence to gain access to political and economic resources.

Ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2007, however, the BNP’s attempt at manipulating the mechanism led to political violence and instability. The AL argued that the chief advisor of the caretaker government was a BNP loyalist and could not be trusted to ensure free and fair elections. The BNP’s refusal to change the composition of the caretaker government intensified the AL’s program of street protests, hartals, and blockades (Hagerty, 2007, p.106). This eventually led to the military’s intervention on January 11, 2007, the installation of a technocratic caretaker government, and the postponement of parliamentary elections. The caretaker government promised to prepare the country for free and fair elections by issuing voter identity cards with photos to reduce fraud. It also launched an anti-corruption drive that imprisoned several prominent politicians, including Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia. Mehnaaz Momen (2009) suggested that the caretaker government’s treatment of politicians and two-year tenure might lead to efforts to restrict or abolish the system after the elections.

Momen’s prediction was correct. The AL won a landslide victory in the 2008 elections: it won three-fourths of parliamentary seats and gained the clout necessary to make constitutional amendments unilaterally. In June 2011, the AL-dominated parliament passed the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment, which abolished the caretaker system, ostensibly due to a recent Supreme Court ruling that deemed the provision unconstitutional. The BNP accused the ruling party of taking steps to deliberately disadvantage the opposition. The AL retorted that the caretaker system was undemocratic, as it enables an unelected body to rule the country during the 90-day transition from one elected government to the next, and therefore unconstitutional. It argued that the Electoral Commission would conduct free and fair elections, as do its counterparts in other democracies without a caretaker government system.

Bangladesh therefore witnessed a stunning, albeit unsurprising, reversal of roles: the AL, the party that had launched a two-year campaign of parliamentary boycotts, hartals, and blockades from 1994 to 1996 against the then ruling BNP for the institutionalization of the caretaker government, now, as the ruling party, abolished the provision in June 2011 and watched the BNP and other opposition parties violently enforce hartals and blockades through December 2013. Just as the AL refused to participate in elections organized by the BNP in February 1996, the BNP boycotted the parliamentary elections on January 5, 2014. The AL declared an electoral victory and, as of February 2015, did not concede to the BNP’s demand for new elections under a non-partisan caretaker government.

In 2011, the AL-dominated parliament passed an amendment to reinstate ‘secularism’ in the constitution. Although the amendment made secularism an immutable constitutional principle, the BNP vowed to strike it from the constitution whenever it comes to power. Conflictual politics in Bangladesh has made policy continuity and stability elusive as power holders rewrite the rules of the game in order to consolidate power and marginalize opponents. Bangladesh’s first-past-the-post single member district electoral system paves the way for elective dictatorship, whereby the winning party dominates decision making, marginalizes opponents, and thereby increases the likelihood of political violence. Arend Lijphart (1996), in Constitutional Choices for New Democracies, argues that majoritarian models of government, such as the first-past-the-post parliamentary system, tend to foster more conflictual politics than consensus models, such as parliamentary proportional representation, because they foster winning party dominance in parliament, wasted votes, high barriers to entry for smaller parties, and fewer opportunities for power sharing. Bangladesh’s electoral system increases the possibility of landslide victories that enhance the winning party’s ability to make unilateral decisions and thereby intensify inter-party conflict (Przeworski, 2004; Riaz, 2013; Kalimullah and Hasan, 2014).

As Sheri Berman (1997) has argued, the absence of responsive political institutions may contribute to citizens’ increased reliance on non-state actors for access to goods and services, but may also erode state actors’ legitimacy and exacerbate political instability. In explaining Bangladesh’s admirable gains in educational access, health, and poverty alleviation, observers recognize the contributions of non-state actors, who supplemented government policies and initiatives (The Economist, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2013; O’Malley, 2013). Two of the world’s most celebrated non-governmental organizations (NGOs) originated in Bangladesh: BRAC and the Grameen Bank. NGOs such as Ain o Salish Kendra, Naripokkho, and Nijera Kori have played a vital role in criminalizing fatwa-related extrajudicial punishments, reducing acid attacks, stalling unjust evictions, challenging land grabs, and strengthening workers’ and minorities’ rights (interview, human rights lawyer, January 25, 2010). While such NGOs have generally sought to strengthen the social foundations of democracy in Bangladesh, non-state actors who do not necessarily support political and civil liberties have also emerged and challenged the very authority and legitimacy of the government, as Hefazat-e-Islam did in 2013.

As this overview of Bangladesh’s political history has shown, challenges to state authority in Bangladesh have generally stemmed from the inability of institutions to adequately ensure power sharing, consensual decision making, and distribution of resources. Yet, political will for electoral reform is likely to be elusive among the two major parties (interviews, BNP and JP members, Dhaka, 2010), as an alternative system might threaten to dim the seemingly irresistible prospect of controlling state resources, require engagement in consensual decision making, and increase opportunities for inter-party checks on power. Until structural problems are addressed, however, attempts to suppress challenges are unlikely to foster sustainable political stability.